Quantum conception of economic change
By: Reza Madjidzadeh
Abstract:
There are two different approaches to the proposition of time inmeta-theoretical sphere of social science: one falls within the framework ofNewtonian paradigm and the other within the Quantum paradigm. Expanding themeta-theoretical system of quantum paradigm, this paper attempts to offer anappropriate system with the objective of providing an analytical frameworktoward conception economic change using the “Nested Games” theory.
JEL codes: B41; B52
Keywords: Quantum paradigm, Nested games, economic change and Quantum nestedgames.
Introduction
There are two different approaches to the proposition of time inmeta-theoretical sphere of social science. This paper attempts to offer anappropriate system to the proposition of time which be consistent with quantumapproach. Changing economic analysis metric toward quantum conception is thecore problem orientation of this paper. Static foundations of mainstreameconomics prevent tracing economic dynamics. It’s not possible to explain both static and dynamic features in unitpartial theory. Each theory creates its own discourse space in which we caninterpret the world around us, position of phenomena and change the settingstoward our beliefs. Guidelines of theorizing North (2005) suggests a system based on triple grand theory. The systemconsists of a theory on institutional framework, a theory on demographicchange, i.e. quantity and quality of human being and a theory on the stock ofhuman knowledge. Yet, there is no bridge to link these three partial theoriestogether. In this article it is suggested that incorporating North’s point ofview and Tsebelis’s nested games theory can help us to set up an appropriateanalytical framework to account for dynamics of socio-economic systems.
Next section is devoted to take a review on the proposition oftime in social science. There are two main approaches dealing with the subject:Newtonian and Quantum. Second section explains implications of second approachon understanding economic world. Whether you take a static stance or dynamicstance, conception will be affected. Conception of economic world is dependingon your perception of world. Third section rearranges economic world accordingwith quantum concepts. Good deal with this problem, however, is very hard. Insection four I’ll contrast North’s method with Tsebelis’s nested games theory.Then, in section five incorporating two theoretical systems lead us to suggestappropriate system toward quantum conception of economic world. Quantumconception isn’t my aim. That’s a point of view making economics moreefficient. Quantum methodology can growexplanatory value of new theories based on that.
Time in social science
There has been a main stream approach to proposition of time insocial science, affecting ontological, methodological and epistemologicalaspects of theorizing. Cartesian foundations of the approach led socialscientists to ignore the time in conceptualization of social world. The centralidea of such an approach is the unification essence of phenomena. Hence aphenomenon in every time (and space) will be same. More ever, whether is thekind of phenomenon, social scientist’s mathematical formulation of phenomenaidentifies them in terms of numbers and quantities and we can deduct anystatement based on numbered identities. If we treat social order as a timelessphenomenon, in the way time can be measured without need to account forprocesses, then abstraction of social realities from time attitudes won’t denyour statements explanatory value. Moreover we would have a universal theory.
Mainstream economics and sociology are subject to principles ofNewtonian paradigm, Euclidean point of view and Cartesian epistemology.Euclidean-Cartesian point of view draws socio-economic world by microscopicidentities. In this manner, conceptionof socio-economic reality relies on a linear space imagination-without anygravity and friction. So, we have to focus on behavior rather than action andpraxis. We treat people as material. We abstract socio-economic reality fromtime and space dimensions. We decompose that into separated components. Hencethe whole socio-economic system would realize as the simple summation of the numbers(individuals). There is an explicit assumption in mainstream economics whichhave important implications on knowledge transfer and universalization oftheories: Acceleration of different coordinate systems is equal. According tothe assumption in all of socio-economic systems any process of feedback andadaptation take place in same duration. So any casual relation observed in Awould be truth in B. In other word reactions to any event are same in all ofthe systems.
Therefore change is simply defined as transfer from one point toanother. The process of change and transfer of knowledge is subject to Lorentztransformation. Here we can treat information in social science as light inphysics. According to Piotrowski and Sladkowski, “although the effective markethypothesis assumes immediate price reaction to new information concerning themarket, the information flow rate is limited by physical laws such us theconstancy of the speed of light” (Piotrowski and Sladkowski 2004: 4). Hence we can’t assume similar adaptation ratefor different socio-economic systems. Hodgson (2001) points out this problem as“historical specificity in social science”. When the speed of information flowand reactions (consciousness, cognition, mental models, decision and choice)stays constant in any coordinate system, we can ignore the effects of praxisand institutions as social constraints to behavior. Then, there is need toreplace behavior by action. In other word, we must set a system to account forsocial gravities along with human choices.
There have been alternative points of view emphasizing historicalevolution and economic dynamics on the base of non-Euclidean-Cartesianworldview. Meta-theoretical foundations of some alternative views areconsistent with quantum physics epistemological implications and Darwinianorganic ontology. Having focused on dynamic nature of social reality, thesepoint alternatives prohibited abstracting time from socio-economic phenomena.In one hand an organic being is related to its past, and in other, time is notdependent from matter (organism or non-organism) and movements of matter definetime. Knowing specificities and properties of phenomena requires trackingcontinual changes in interacting organs. So history matters in a sense of pathdependency (Hodgson, 2001: 3).
Therefore change is occurred by continual sequences. A sequence isconsisting of five factors: event, information flow, mental process, decision,and action (social or individual). Yet, we don’t have a coherent analyticalsystem to explain change in this manner. Action aims toward change, so there isnow reason to impose static models on that. Action is a dynamic process.
During two centuries, Marxists, historians and institutionaleconomists have been investigated for such a coherent system. Importance ofhistory and social and political aspects of socio-economic system are theirmost fundamental achievements toward establishing new paradigm. Howeverconception of soio-economic world into new language to capture dynamic aspectsof four dimension space requires regression to paradigm level issues. Veryfailures or incompleteness of current analytical systems lead us to revise ourmeta-theoretical models. Quantum physics meta-theoretical implications have agreat potential to expand such a system. Next section is devoted to illustratequantum physics meta-theoretical implications, toward “quantum paradigm”.
Quantum Paradigm
Paradigm is the common sphere of established epistemology,ontology and methodology. Different theoretical disciplines share theirexplanation rules in paradigm discourse space. In other word, meta-level ofreduction take theoretical terms into paradigm sphere. We identify events and phenomena in terms ofreduced conception channels. Our worldview directs our identification methods.Any reorientation in channeling conception directions affects both discoursespace of theorizing and meta-theoretical sphere of shared principles. Socialsciences have been affected by revolutions in physics and biology. Bothclassical physics and Darwinian evolutionary biology have inspired socialscientists in explaining socio-economic world. Concepts such as equilibrium,evolution and natural order are samples of the affection. Now we can reorientsocial science by focus on conception channels and methodological foundation ofquantum physics and relativity theory.
Non-Euclidean geometry, Minkowsky space, relativity theory andinconstant speed of light are contents of quantum paradigm. Non-Euclideangeometry defines a curved space in which Euclidean rules don’t matter. Einsteinillustrated that as replacing analytical geometry by experimental geometry. Thekey of difference is Gravitation. Gravitation affects space-time position ofmass. Deviations from expected directions or results in large scale areexplained by gravity. We can translate gravity into socio-economic language aspraxis, and structure of social action. Such translation is incomplete withoutintroducing a concept showing gravitation fields which are origins of deviationfrom pure rational behavior. Gravitation among social phenomena would preventus to abstract human action from its space-time specificities. So we live inworld of events. Space and time transform to event in the light of relativity(Russell, 1925: 199-230). Social reality is the combination of phenomena suchas social interaction and technological matters related to human factor. Thenontological aspects of that must be treated in a dynamic manner (Lawson, 2003:16).
Accepting this ontological stance, epistemological relativism willbe recognized as consistent with dynamic ontological view. Therefore knowledgeis accessible provided that historical and context-based descriptions of socialreality. Context contains observer. In 18th and 19thcentury, Historical evolution was introduced. The meta-theoretical foundationsof this view are consistent with Darwinism and Quantum revolution. Yet, theserevolutions didn’t adequately affect social science. Although there is sometheoretical school in the subject, meta-theoretical implications of the twoevents have not been completely accounted for.
Evolutionary point of view don’t allow to abstract time dimensionfrom phenomenon. Because of interrelations between components of a collection,understanding its properties requires tracking continual transformations of thecollection and its components. Every organism is subject to its past. Evolutionis based on heritages of past. Therefore historical specificity of phenomenonmatters (Hodgson, 2001: 3). Hence change and time closely are related together,so we can’t explain dynamics by imposing static tools on observations andshowing simple changes in Cartesian coordination independent from theprocess.
There are some schools of thought taking into account these pointsof view. Nevertheless no coherent analytical system has been suggested.Coherency of analytical system refers to not also hierarchical ontologicalconsistency but also internal correspondence between dynamic tools and trackingprocess of becoming of the subject- this is motion produces time and time isnot dependent from body movements. During last two centuries, Karl Marx, GermanHistorians, Joseph Schumpeter and Institutional Economists have tried toprovide such a system. Emphasizing on importance of historical specificity andpath-dependency are main achievements of their attempts.
Nevertheless, these achievements must be completed by regardingmeta-theoretical implications of other scientific disciplines. Quantumrevolution in physics has a great potential of reorienting economic dynamicsanalysis on the basis of which. I called such a new system Quantunomics,reorienting economic dynamics theorizing by attaching paradigm implications ofquantum physics to that.
Toward new system
Discarding any ambiguous tale and myth, I will focus on Lorentztransformation, inconstant speed of light, space-time, different accelerationof coordination systems, and non-Euclidean geometry. Expanding theirimplications for economics into meta-theoretical language, point of view ofsome social scientists will be attached to them. Then, a primarily system willbe introduced.
Before juxtaposition of above elements, introducing coreassumption of the system is necessary. Special relativity is based on constantspeed of light. If P is a point in empty space and P′ is another point near P-distance between them is equal to ε-and a light ray propagates from P in time tand get to P in time t+dt then wehave:
EMBED PBrush
Where x1, x2 and x3 are spacecoordination of ε, c is speed of light and x4 is time coordinate.This formulation shows Euclidean metric. The equation introducing this metricsis applied to differentials of coordination. In special relativity, the onlypermitted change in coordination is in the way that ε۲ in newcoordination system will be equal to summation of coordination’s differentials.This is so called Lorentz transformation implies that universality of observedand alleged causalities is true under condition of constant speed of light andequal acceleration of coordination system. In other word causality is necessarybut uncertain. We can translate this theorem into economics by the analyticalrules of institutional economics. Since the process of adaptation of socio-economicsystems depends on the speed of propagation of information in the systems andreaction to that, we witness different performance in long run. That is gravityfields in economic space makes information deviated. This is why North (1990)explains economic world by friction, transaction costs.
If we accept balance among all coordination systems, then, byassuming constant speed of light and Euclidean metrics, general relativity willbe validate, so we have:
EMBED PBrush Where g,μ and ν are functions of x1 … x4. That’s thedifference between these spaces with Euclidean space. Here, distribution andcomposition of bodies determine the gravity field, so space forms subject tophysical factors and we witness a deviation from expected Newton-Galilean relativityprinciple.
To summarize my thesis ineconomic words, information in economy have a function same as light inphysics. Photons are related to energy. Einstein formulation of energy containsspeed of light as a determinant factor. In economic world informationpropagates and makes us to have a reaction. Our actions plan to change ourcondition. Our planning is done by information. Information propagates inphysical world and is processed in our mind. So information passes throughgravity fields and lock in frictions. In other world, Lorentz transformationrule matters whether in propagation of information and adaptation.
It follows that, transformation of socio-economic systems issubject to the way information propagated and gravity fields of socio-economicorganism. Hence, this is necessary to set up a system encompassing both ofmicroscopic identities and macroscopic identities interacting with each other.Institution as a transhistorical concept, containing historical specificity,allows taking the interaction into account. Yet tracking interaction processrequires an analytical system. If we set social exchange as analytical startingpoint, then we can account for all non-Euclidean properties of socio-economicspace in the face of game theory.
Since mid of 1990s, game theory have attracted some institutionaleconomists. Avner Grief (1997) called that “game theoretical revolution inhistorical and comparative institutional analysis”. Institutions are the ruleof games and games result in new institutions. G, M. Hodgson (2002) inexamining agenda of evolution of institutions suggests taking initialinstitutions for granted. Language is the initial condition institution andsocial interaction is based on. Establishing game theoretical analysis bytreating language as the initial condition will help us avoiding infiniteregress. Game theory is a suitable metric to capture above features. Althoughlack of a consensus on the problem of agency and structure, game theoreticalanalysis have features taking into account the theorists of agency andstructure problem. Partly, tracking structuration, emerging properties andother comments on the problem are answered by game theoretical analysis.
Now, what is new in this article? I reshow institutional frameworkby quantum concepts, is that enough? Till now, I have extrapolated guidelinesto establish new system. Although it seems that quantum concepts reviewed herehave no contributions to improve our knowledge about economic change,incorporating some correspondent approaches covering above guidelines will takeus near our expected system.
To summarize, establishing quantum based analytical system will bebased on institutional theory, game theory and a meta-theory to incorporatethem.
Quantunomics
Epistemological relativismis the main meta-theoretical implication of quantum revolution. Building ananalytical framework upon that requires an approach not also taking account foragents’ interactions but tracking the process of the interaction and emergingproperties. In other word, we need both transhistorical concepts andinteraction based approach.
J, S. Coleman (1990) suggested minimal systems analysis to solveaggregation and decomposition problem in social science. Coleman’s analyticalsystem is based on minimal systems, i.e. decomposing macrosocial propositionsinto three microsocial proposition. Figure (1) shows Coleman’s suggestedsystem.
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A proposition provided for the relation between A and B is amacrosocial proposition. AC shows shifts from structure to agents’ sphere. CDis the realm of interactions among agents and DB is the direction ofaggregation to macro sphere. This figure is the scheme of socio-economicformation. In position A, information trickle down to agents and they organizetheir actions according to processed information. The social exchanges beginand equilibrium of the exchanges – game to catch scarce resource and exchangingthem-take the socio-economic system to B (Coleman, 1990: 15-34).
What we call change is a motion from AB to other structure, e.g.A´B´. The motion creates time. From A to B is being and from AB to A´B´ isbecoming. The time for AB is different from time to ABA´B´, i.e. changing scaleof analysis take us to different time coordination. Therefore, examiningindividual agents’ behavior has different time features from the wholestructure. Since different adaptation speeds make variety of accelerations,examining structure is subject to equation (2) and examining individual agent’sbehavior is subject to equation (1). Here examining socio-economic exchange issubjects to equation (2), so there is correspondent between structure-basedanalysis and explanation relying upon game theory. Tracking motions enables usto explain economic change; however, we must explore the figure by moredetails.
Economic historians must explain structure influence on economicperformance and dynamics of the structure (North, 1981:3-7). According to North(1990), agents organize their actions subject to the incentives ofinstitutional structure. To our scheme, in position A, information about thenature of position propagate among agents. Information contains codes ofeconomic resource and trends of them. These codes produce incentives tomotivate agents, so they act to improve themselves to better position. Themovement needs arriving in socio-economic exchange. Now agents begin to investin socio-economic transaction. Investment mean planning strategies towardacquire more resource or better bargaining power. Here we witness a patterned mass of events and games.North (2005) puts out that:” it is result of change (1) in the quantity andquality of human beings; (2) in the stock of human knowledge particularly asapplied to the human command over nature; and (3) in the institutionalframework that defines the deliberate incentive structure of a society”(North,2005:1). Now, the patterned mass isclearer. So, how can we incorporate these three fields into an analyticalframework? How can we do the puzzle with these parts?
Understanding the status of reality and its change, therelationship between beliefs and economic performance and the nature of processare the fundamental questions (ibid: 4). Though, North describe the fundamentalproblems and theories necessary to understand economic change, he didn’tprovide a clear way to applying his suggested system in terms of a unifiedtheoretical system. We are faced with the concept of non-ergodic world by whichNorth means that averages calculated from the past observations can bepersistently different from the time average of future outcomes (ibid,19).
Since probability matters by this definition and possibledeviations from expected path are taken for granted, the concept of non-ergodicworld is consistent with quantum view. Looking for a theoretical frameworkNorth (2005: 12) suggests that; time dimension is incorporated as an integralpart of analysis. We can do that by attaching north triple-theories toColeman’s system. Yet, we don’t have a detailed plan to tracking change and wehave locked in ambiguous concepts. Along North’s works many fruitful conceptshave been provided to understand dynamics of socio-economic systems. However,we need an order to set them in right places.
In North’s conceptual program human interaction and humanenvironment play a critical role. Hence every order must be based on humaninteraction. In other word, the stock of knowledge, tension between populationand resources and institutions are related to human interactions and humanenvironment.
After propagating, knowledge is developed. Propagating is aninteraction-based factor. Institutions are the rules of the game. Peopleinvolved in games and compete with each other. Scarcity of resource inmacrosocial view means that tension for acquiring them will be between humanand nature, however, the tension will be between human and human to.
It follows that; game theory is the suitable system to handle theproblem. However, game theoretical analysis must capture not onlytriple-theories of North but also takes “artificially separated frameworks”into account. Recently game theoreticalrevolution has been affected institutional historical analysis. Scarcity ofresource in macrosocial view means that tension for acquiring them will bebetween human and nature, however, the tension will be between human and humanto. It follows that; game theory is the suitable system to handle the problem.However, game theoretical analysis must capture not only triple-theories of North but also takes “artificially separated frameworks”۳into account.
Recently game theoretical revolution has been affectedinstitutional historical analysis. Aoki (2001), Grief (1997) and Tsebelis(1990) are some theorists applying game theory to institutional analysis.Though Grief and Aoki are known for institutional economists, Tsebelis is notvery famous. In 1990 He introduced “nested games theory” to analysis ofinstitutions in political world. Heintroduced a game theoretical system for analyzing institutional change andseemingly irrational choices. Moreover, Tsebelis’s system has great potentialto interdisciplinary explanations and incorporating three separateddisciplines. Tsebelis (1990: 5) notes that:
“The interaction between economics andpolitics can also be conceptualized as several different games played by thesame actors.
The study of any one of these games in isolation may lead to puzzles similar to theFinish case. Only the study of the whole network of games in which an actor is involved will reveal the actor’s motivations and explainhis behavior”.
In mainstream game theory, explanation focus is on a single game.Furthermore the rationality of players is taken for granted. The process of changeinvolves all aspects of socio-economic life. Narrow focus on a single gameraises the probability of observing irrational choice. In many situations, itseems that actor make a suboptimal choice. This is because that observer pays her attention to a single game andshe ignores the network of games in which player involved. According toTsebelis (1990: 7-8):
“There are two major reasons fordisagreement between actor and observer. First, option Ai is not optimalbecause the actor is involved in games in several different arenas, but theobserver focuses on only one arena.
In the second case, option Ai is notoptimal because the actor “innovate”, that is, takes steps to increase the number of available options so that somenew option is now better than Ai”.
When the actor is involved in network of related games andequilibrium of each game is interrelated with other games, we can apply a modelto analyze such a network of games. Tsebelis (1990) suggests nested gamestheory to deal with the problem. Nested games theory emphasizes oninstitutional context of human interaction. In nested games theory we are facedwith two main spheres; multiple arena and institutional design;
“In the case of games in multiplearenas, the observer considers the game in the principle arena without taking contextual factors into account, whereas theactor perceives that the game is nested inside a bigger game that defines how contextual factors…influence his payoffs and those of the other players.
In the case of institutional design,the game in the principal arena is nested inside a bigger game where the rulesof the game themselves are variable; in this game, the set of available optionsis considerably larger than in the original one”.
(Tsebelis,1990:8).
Consequently, in nested games theory some games played towardchanging the rules of the game and increasing number of choices. Thus institutions are involved in theanalytical system. Furthermore, thelinkage between CD and AC in figure (1) is established.
Again, we refer to North’s triple-theories to analyze economicchange. There were three theories on institutions, tension between human being and resources and stock of knowledge. A theory oninstitutions must take state, ideology and property rights into account. Statesdetermine property rights and formal institutions, so they constraint choices.Ideology affects the mental processing of human kind and her choices. Andproperty rights are the main factor in transforming property to capital andachieving transaction. Efficient property rights decrease transaction costs.The lower transaction costs, the higher economic performance.
Tsebelis’s system can help us to explain institutional change and tension between resources and population. In figure(1) CD sphere describes the tension and institutional design. The equilibria ofgames in CD take socio-economic system to B. Here population has established the institutional framework, bargaining power of social classes redistributed orestablished and the knowledge about the kinds of outcomes of differentinstitutions accumulate. The knowledge can transform preferences overpolicies and personal procedures for life (Tsebelis, 1990:98-100).
Then, B plays the role of A in change. Again informationpropagates to the level of CD. Information contains incentives of institutionalframework and knowledge areas suitable for this framework. However, from A to Binstitutions may changes or not.
We can place state in CD. States are players. According to North(1990), state looks for benefits of political body. So, every player has threegames in her/him life; a game on social status, a game on political power (orbargaining power) and a game on economic interactions. In political games eachplayer tries to establish or replace institutions to acquire more benefit orpayoff. Though bargaining power distributed in first conditions, i.e. afterrevolution or immigration to new land or war, every player will attempt toimprove that.
Information propagated, games of CD level will begin. HereTsebelis (1990: 55) use subgame concepts to explain networked games. Subgame isa game between two or more players that can be completely isolated from thegames around it and can be solved on its own. Tracking economic change meansfocus on economic games and placed other level as subgame.
Whether economy develops or not is depend on the influence of thegames on each other. Equal bargaining power is responsible for efficiency ofthe games rules and games directions. Otherwise the effect of non-economicgames deviate results from expected path and transaction costs increaseeconomic performance.
Though nested games theory provides a suitable analytical systemto explain economic change, there is a problem in determining contextualconditions. According to Hodgson (2002) assuming an established institution,i.e. language, will help us to avoid form infinite regress. Indeed, there isnow complete and adequate theoretical system. Every suggested system has itsown defects. This is the nature of science and science is separated fromphilosophy in this point.
My quantum conception is elementary and it needs more and morecorrections to be better than its current status.
۵- Conclusion
Because of having static tools, current economic approach to theproposition of time and change must improve. Meta-theoretical implications ofquantum physics have a great potential to accomplish economics by dynamic toolsand concepts. This will be done in paradigm level. Paradigm is the sphere ofsharing methodological, epistemological and ontological compartments of allsciences.
Lorentz transformation, non-Euclidean geometry and inconstant speedof light are the main concepts helping in find dynamic tools. By customizingthese concepts in socioeconomic theoretical system we get to game theory,institutional analytical system and a linkage between them.
North’s triple-theories are correspondent with game theoreticalbased conceptual system and Tsebelis’ nested games theory have to dimension,one describe institutional design and the other explains tension betweenresources and population’s wants. Coleman’s minimal system analysis is asuitable base to analyze interactions of players. Moreover Coleman’s system,partly, provide an answer to the problem of agency and structure.
Thus, my final conclusion is that information propagates instructure. Signals emanated motivate actors to play game and to provideresource and benefit. They not only invest in resource but also try to changeinstitutional framework. Often they are unable to change the structure and thepath-dependency locks them in an unchanged structure. State is also a player.Ideology determine the reflexivity of path-dependency and state by specifyingproperty rights determines the quantity of properties transformed to capitaland lead to growth. The final equilibrium is the first step to shift fromagent’s level to structure. Again information will propagate and knowledge willbe accumulate correspond with the incentives structure according to payoffs.
Whether economy develops or not is depend on the influence of thegames on each other. Equal bargaining power is responsible for efficiency ofthe games rules and games directions. Otherwise the effect of non-economicgames deviate results from expected path and transaction costs increaseeconomic performance.
However, my suggested system is elementary. Yet, there areunsolved problems. This is the nature of science and there is one way to dealwith the problem, i.e. experimental studies.
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– rezamadjidzadeh@csri.ac.ir
– Einsteinintroduced Lorentz invariance. An invariance principle is a statement aboutconstancy of physical laws. According to invariance principle all laws remainsunchanged for one particular change of conditions (Ford, 2002, 157-158).
– Discrete disciplines;economics, politics and sociology. See North (2005: 11).
